University of Mississippi

eGrove
Honors Theses

Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale
Honors College)

Spring 5-1-2021

Finding the Missing Peace: A Postcolonial Feminist Analysis of
UNSCR 1325 in the African Union and European Union
Katie Dames

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis
Part of the Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Commons, and the Race, Ethnicity and PostColonial Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Dames, Katie, "Finding the Missing Peace: A Postcolonial Feminist Analysis of UNSCR 1325 in the African
Union and European Union" (2021). Honors Theses. 1737.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/1737

This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell
Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

FINDING THE MISSING PEACE:
A POSTCOLONIAL FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF UNSCR 1325 IN THE AFRICAN UNION
AND EUROPEAN UNION

© 2021
By Katherine Marie Lozon Dames

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
Croft Institute for International Studies
Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College
The University of Mississippi

University, Mississippi
May 2021

Approved:
___________________________________
Dr. Emily Fransee
___________________________________
Dr. William Schenck
___________________________________
Dr. Timothy Nordstrom

© 2021
Katherine Marie Lozon Dames
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ii

ABSTRACT
The UN Security Council’s landmark resolution 1325 created the Women, Peace and
Security (WPS) Agenda, a strategy for harnessing women’s potential in peace processes and
improving the status of women, who suffer disproportionately in conflict. Twenty years later,
UNSCR 1325 has been implemented through 89 National Action Plans and several Regional
Action Plans, but the institutions that perpetuate structural violence persist, albeit with more
inclusion of women. Through a postcolonial feminist lens, this thesis informs on the differing
approaches to WPS in the African Union and the European Union. It asks the reader to
reconceptualize and reimagine a “feminist peace” that acknowledges underlying systems that
perpetuate conflict on and off the battlefield. By assessing the implementation plans of the
African Union and the European Union, I will analyze the nuances in content and structure that
exhibit the masculinized patterns of the security field and illuminate the lasting impact of
colonialism in peace interventions.
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TERMINOLOGY
AU: African Union
EU: European Union
NAP: National Action Plan
RAP: Regional Action Plan
UNSCR 1325: UN Security Council Resolution 1325
WPS: Women, Peace and Security
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In October 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325, setting the
agenda for Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in the UN and its member states. During remarks
made on the 20th anniversary of the landmark United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325,
UN Secretary-General António Guterres said “gender equality is first and foremost a question of
power, and wherever we look, power structures are dominated by men.”1 In order to fulfill the
aim of gender equality set forth by UNSCR 1325, Secretary-General Guterres proposed that the
UN must work to involve women in political spheres and peacekeeping. However, these power
structures are dominated by men because they were built by and for men, particularly those in
the Global North. The WPS Agenda has not achieved a “feminist peace” because the
mechanisms that it uses to inch toward this goal fall in line with the masculine and colonial
structures that are omnipresent in the international security sphere.
After 20 years of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, significant progress has yet to
be made in deconstructing the concepts and structures that allow conflict to continue. As nation
states and regional bodies develop UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs) and Regional
Action Plans (RAPs), the institutions that create war continue to persist, albeit with slightly more
involvement of women. Using a postcolonial feminist lens, this thesis aims to inform about the
current structural differences across regional approaches to international peace and gender. It
asks the reader to reconceptualize and reimagine a “feminist peace” that acknowledges
underlying systems that perpetuate conflict on and off the battlefield. By assessing the WPS
measures taken by the African Union and the European Union, I will analyze the nuances in

1

António Guterres, “Secretary-General's briefing to the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security,” (Speech,
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content and structure that exhibit the masculinized patterns of the security field and illuminate
the lasting impact of colonialism in foreign peace interventions. While there have been
postcolonial feminist studies on national and international-level WPS policies, little literature has
addressed the trends in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 within regional bodies such as the
AU and EU. Instead of looking at NAPs of individual countries in the AU and EU to assess
regional attitudes toward UNSCR 1325, as other scholars have, I will look at the language in the
documents of the EU and AU themselves to show the importance of regional organizations as
intermediaries between international and national WPS policies. Additionally, I will delineate
how postcolonialism operates in the history, relationships and policies of these two organizations
through UNSCR 1325.
Development of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda
Following the 1995 Beijing World Conference for Women, peacebuilders saw an
opportunity to change the face of peace and conflict.2 The United Nations and women’s
advocacy groups and NGOs sought to change the trajectory of war as a century of genocide and
global conflict came to a close. Anti-war feminists had previously focused on topics such as
development, human rights and gender based violence through UN institutions like the General
Assembly or through various commissions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).3
UNSCR 1325 was revolutionary for breaking into the Security Council, the most
powerful, masculine-dominated institution governing world conflicts. UNSCR 1325 redefined
understandings of the Security Council and women’s issues as addressed by the UN. By
spotlighting both the reliance of the success of security measures on women and the long-ignored
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Carol Cohn, “Mainstreaming Gender in UN Security Policy: A Path to Political Transformation,” in Global
Governance,ed. S. M. Rai et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 187.
3
Ibid.
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gendered impact of conflict, UNSCR 1325 incentivized the Security Council to think more
broadly about actors in conflict and how to include oft-dismissed women as a means to end
conflict.
As of December 2020, 89 member states and 11 regional governing bodies have adopted
Action Plans to approach the WPS and Security Agenda.4 The four pillars of the WPS Agenda
are Participation, Prevention, Protection and Relief and Recovery. Although the definitions vary
from body to body, here are four definitions that encompass the general themes from my
research:
1. Participation addresses the calls for increased involvement of women in peace
processes and post-conflict policymaking, as well as gender parity at all decisionmaking levels of government.
2. Protection deals with gender-based violence in conflict and in humanitarian
situations.
3. The goal of Prevention is to ensure that conflict can be avoided through
intervention strategies related to gender-based violence, supporting women’s
rights and prosecuting those who violate international law.
4. The last pillar, Relief and Recovery, reflects a need to respond to conflict and
humanitarian emergencies through a gendered lens, taking into consideration the
specific needs for displaced women and girls, such as reproductive healthcare and
economic recovery.
As an initiative driven almost entirely by NGO involvement, UNSCR 1325 stakeholders
continue to host yearly anniversary meetings in order to drive the WPS Agenda forward.
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However, 20 years of progress on an agenda that does not dismantle the structures that
perpetuate conflict means little for actual progress toward a feminist peace. Feminist peace is a
field within peace studies that observes how women in conflict and in peacebuilding serve
beyond traditionally accepted gender roles. Feminist peace scholars strive to illustrate how
women and other marginalized groups can be incorporated into peace processes in order to
propose conceptualization of peace that are mindful of those disproportionately impacted by
conflict. Among feminist peace scholars, there is a consensus that military and security
institutions themselves are contradictory to ideals of peace. Themes that frequently appear in this
literature include intersectionality, reconciliation, transitional justice and human security.5
The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom is one of founding members
of the UNSCR 1325 NGO Working Group and perhaps best exemplifies the idea of feminist
peace as accepted by feminist peace scholars. WILPF lists their priorities as advancing “feminist
peace for equality, justice and demilitarised security” and “stigmatizing war and violence.” The
ideal outcome for feminist peace activists is not women’s equality in conflict but the removal of
structures that continue conflict.6
Theoretical Framework
I utilize a postcolonial feminist lens to investigate how the implementation of UNSCR
1325 is affected by differing conceptions of womanhood and security among regional
governments in the Global North and South. The terminology “feminist” is preferred in this
thesis instead of “gendered” because the analysis seeks to interpret UNSCR 1325’s role in
establishing a “feminist peace” that advocates for marginalized groups in conflict. While this
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Catia Cecilia Confortini, "Feminist Contributions and Challenges to Peace Studies," Oxford Research Encyclopedia
of International Studies (30 Nov. 2017) accessed 29 Jan. 2021.
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thesis does refer to how prescribed gender roles impact peace and security, it is important to note
the diversity of global gender roles across cultures, as well as the fact that the epistemology of
gender is largely dominated by Global North research.7
My research includes a focus on postcolonialism because both the African Union and
European Union were established during the process of decolonization, and the historical
“othering” of Europe as colonizers and Africa as colonized perpetuates in policy today. To
evaluate how the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the AU and EU interact with postcolonial
feminist conceptions of peace, I will review how the language within these reports, consciously
or not, compare the Global South and Global North, as well as the measures by which the
regional entities incorporate women into existing or new peace and security structures. To
interpret this data, I will look at the “othering” of women and Global South countries, the
construction of the Global North as a protector, the creation of measures by the state to control
its own violence and the facade of gender equality in masculine, inherently peace-opposed
institutions.
Feminist Peace
To formulate a conceptualization of feminist peace for this analysis, I looked within the
field of feminist peace research. Linda Rennie Forcey asserts that feminist understandings of
peace must “reject: (1) the assumption that women and men have essential natures; (2) the
Kantian notion of the ‘categorical imperative’ as a universally self-evident value; and (3) the
existence of any universalism except in its interested and particularized context.”8 Those
participating in the field of feminist peace research face complex conversations— gender and

7

Oyeronke Oyewumi, “Conceptualizing Gender: The Eurocentric Foundations of Feminist Concepts and the
Challenge of African Epistemologies,” Jenda: A Journal of Culture and African Women Studies 2, no. 1 (2002), 1.
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5

women’s roles must not be relegated to stereotypes or assumptions of fragility, and the
experience of women cannot be universalized to assume that gender is the most dominant cause
of marginalization in a women’s life. Therefore, feminist peace relies on looking at the power
structures that create these stereotypes and how layers of identity (gender, location, etc.) factor
into marginalization in conflict and peace.
In this sense, feminist peace research also has a clear relationship to the concepts of
othering explored in the literature review. Annick Wibben, Catia Cecilia Confortini, Sanam
Roohi, Sarai B. Aharoni, Leena Vastapuu and Tiina Vaittinen contend that feminist peace
research “explores the sexual and gendered social orders, which re/produce violence exactly
because of attempts to make the world fit into the binary hierarchy of male/female,
masculine/feminine.”9
Tarja Väyrynen, Swati Parashar, Elise Féron and Catia Cecilia Confortini write about the
diverse field of field studies, asserting that the feminist idea that peace is not a singular or linear
event but a process with multiple contestations and challenges…Peace in this sense does not
mean a state of absolute lack of fictions, struggles, or conflict. Rather it refers to an unstable
equilibrium among several contradictory forces, which does not degenerate into violence of any
sort.”10 While these conflicts are varied, what is central to critical feminist peace research in the
authors’ conceptualization is an intersectional analysis which “makes the entanglements of
violence, power, and politics visible.”11 In my analysis, I assess the AU and EU implementation
reports with an intersectional lens and call for an understanding of the structural violence in post-
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Annick T.R. Wibben, Catia Cecilia Confortini, Sanam Roohi, Sarai B. Aharoni, Leena Vastapuu, and Tiina
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(2019): 87.
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colonial relationships, including in security structures and peace and security policies. I will
unpack the construction of binaries that “other” women and the Global South in peace and
security measures and consider the assumptions of womanhood, peace and security.
Literature Review
In building a foundation of knowledge to explore this thesis topic, I consulted works from
postcolonial international relations scholars, feminist international relations scholars and
postcolonial feminist international relations scholars. Because of the expansive knowledge of
these groups, I will focus largely on the works of the postcolonial feminist scholars whose work
pertains to UNSCR 1325. Despite UNSCR 1325 being a relatively young document, there has
been a significant quantity of studies on the topic. The three greatest conclusions derived from
the postcolonial feminist literature as the fundamental flaws in the implementation of the WPS
Agenda are the constructions of “white people saving brown women from brown men,” the
contradiction of UNSCR 1325 being a tool of the state that also inflicts violence and the
militarized focus of the agenda that effectively “makes war safe for women.” First, I will
underline how postcolonialism and feminism are connected as a result of dual “othering.”
Dual Othering
What connects postcolonialism and feminism is the othering that often occurs in
discussions of women and the Global South. Nicola Pratt notes that “...realist conceptions of
security are constituted through gendered binaries: male/female; protector/protected;
international/domestic; war/peace; active/passive.”12 Charlotte Hooper defines the gendered
dichotomies of international relations in her book Manly States: Masculinities, International
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Nicola Pratt, "Reconceptualizing Gender, Reinscribing Racial—Sexual Boundaries in International Security: The
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Relations, and Gender Politics. Hooper articulates the construction of the “other” in gender
theory. She illustrates these binaries by categorizing the masculine values of rationality,
autonomy, prudence, strength, power, logic, boundary setting, control and competitiveness and
the feminine qualities of intuition, empathy, vulnerability and cooperation.13 Of these terms, the
first set, the “masculine” qualities, appear more frequently than the feminine in the context of the
UN Security Council’s on WPS.14
In order to understand the involvement of the European Union in Global South
peacekeeping projects, postcolonial scholars have studied the imposition of liberal democratic
values on Global South countries, as well as European erasure of its atrocities abroad. Ian
Manners conceptualized and defined “Normative Power Europe” as the creation or imposition of
European norms on other states driven by a “power over opinion,” as opposed to civilian or
military power.15 Ueli Stager writes that Normative Power Europe required an other to define
itself and impose its norms, consequently using Africa as a foil upon which to implement a
liberal democratic order and development.16 In dealing with its recent historical memory of
genocide, both within the borders of the EU outside, European Union Member States have
chosen to value memorials of abuse near to home rather than address scars abroad while denying
culpability. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey note that even though Germany is seen as the West
today, an imagined non-Western other is created in order to distance Europe in time from the

13

Charlotte Hooper, Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2001), 44.
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Reference appendix 1.
15
Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no.
2 (June 2002): 239. doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00353.
16
Ueli Staeger, “Africa-EU Relations and Normative Power Europe: A Decolonial Pan-African Critique,” Journal
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Holocaust and “[other] mass slaughter from the West and from modernity.”17 Language in
UNSCR 1325 and the other WPS resolutions refer to “socioeconomic factors” and “lack of rule
of law” while ignoring the colonial practices that exploited resources and disrupted local
governance, causing instability. This language, driving notions of the civilized North and
uncivilized South, leaves scholars marking European peacemaking progress in the Global South
as a reincarnation of “Mission Civilisatrice,” the rationale that European powers needed to
colonize in order to modernize or otherwise “advance” other cultures.18
In my analysis, I will explore how the othering of women and the Global South (and the
intersections of these two identifiers) influence language in the documents regarding these two
groups, particularly at Europe’s positioning of itself as a role model and benefactor and the
categorization of women as harbingers of peace.
White People Saving Brown Women from Brown Men
Though the phrase “white men saving brown women from brown men” was first used to
describe the British ban on Sati, or the practice of burning widows on a husband’s funeral pyre,
the resulting concept is interwoven in postcolonial feminist scholars’ critiques of the UNSCR
1325 Agenda. Postcolonial feminist scholar Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak introduced this concept
in her 1988 essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” and it has since been used to discuss the work of
liberal internationalists to introduce women’s rights through UNSCR 1325 at the expense of
framing non-white men as conflict-bound. Nicola Pratt applies this theory to UNSCR 1889
(2009), the third WPS Security Council Resolution which called for attention to the pillar of

17

Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, "The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies," Review of International
Studies, vol 32, no. 2 (2006): 341, accessed September 19, 2020.
http://www.jstor.org.umiss.idm.oclc.org/stable/40072141.
18
Ibid; Roland Paris, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice,’” Review of International Studies
28, (2002): 637–656, accessed October 6, 2020.
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Participation. According to Pratt, blaming Global South women’s obstacles on "violence and
intimidation, lack of security and lack of rule of law, cultural discrimination and stigmatization,
including the rise of extremist or fanatical views on women, and socioeconomic factors including
the lack of access to education,” frames Global South men as unredeemable actors in the peace
processes. Pratt writes that the language present in this document codes brown men as the cause
of brown women’s woes, thus attempting to justify the intervention of the WPS Agenda in
countries deemed fragile.19 Swati Parashar asserts that the focus on certain WPS case studies by
Global North scholars further perpetuates violent stereotypes of “brown men,” focusing on
sexual violence while ignoring state violence toward gender minorities and indigenous people.20
While it is important to understand how groups wield gendered violence as a weapon of war, the
presence of violence in national power structures must be observed similarly in order to consider
the post-colonial and feminist solutions to conflict.
Sahla Aroussi employs Spivak’s theory to scrutinize the erasure of conflict in Global
North countries by Global North countries. She asserts that, “The mistaken assumption that
gender security has been achieved in the West reflects racialised, imperialistic narratives,
inscribed in the UN’s WPS resolutions, that situate Western States as benevolent saviours of
women in the conflict-ridden and poverty-stricken Global South.”21 Aroussi notes that the U.K.
National Action Plan includes nine focus countries in which to promote WPS, while the recent
issues of conflict in Northern Ireland went unmentioned.22 The choice to ignore recent conflict in

19

Pratt, "Reconceptualizing Gender,” 775.
Swati Parashar, “The WPS Agenda: A Postcolonial Critique,” in The Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace, and
Security, edited by Sara E. Davies and Jacqui True, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 834.
21
Sahla Aroussi, “National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security as Tools of Foreign Policy: Reconsidering
Gender Security in the West," NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics, vol.
135 (2017): 29, DOI: 10.3233/978-1-61499-763-4-29.
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Europe, as well as the colonial legacies that engendered conflict abroad, perpetuates the myth of
the Global North as a righteous executor of universal human rights. I will directly draw from
Aroussi and other postcolonial feminist scholars’ analysis to ask questions of white people
saving brown women from brown men at the regional governance level as opposed to country
level, observing how the emphasis of certain WPS pillars and the language included in the
implementation of such pillars serve to form narratives of those involved in conflict.
Saved by the State
Postcolonial feminist scholars note that the United Nations and national governments are
the primary institutions implementing WPS, but both the UN and the state also, even while
serving in the capacity of peace and security missions, inflicts violence on women. Thus, the
language of these projects, and how one conceptualizes gender, is key to understanding and
ending structural violence toward women. Anne Orford argues that the term “gender
mainstreaming,” if ill-defined, may serve more to facilitate the militarized projects of the past
than move toward a feminist peace.23 Soumita Basu looks at the structure and institutions
guiding the WPS Agenda. She notes that the resolution’s origins in the Security Council leave
the WPS Agenda on shaky ground because the Council is viewed as “infamous for its
undemocratic setup and mode of functioning.”24 Problems of inequality are found in the Security
Council from the top to the bottom— UN peacekeeping missions are notorious for sexual abuse,
leading to trauma and economic concerns of mothers if the rapes result in children.25 As the onthe-ground workers alleged to be delivering the missions of UNSCR 1325, scholars note that
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there are deep structural problems to be solved before the WPS Agenda can be implemented for
the good of women.
One point of concern about WPS among postcolonial feminist is that its main form of
regulation and implementation is through National Action Plans (NAPs). In some conflicts, the
states are at fault for part of the violence that may occur during conflict, so depending on the
national government to bring forward a feminist peace may be hindered by the control of the
WPS Agenda by violent actors. Parashar articulates that “when state-led National Action Plans
(NAP) are emphasized as part of the WPS Agenda, they end up endorsing the state’s narrative of
the conflict and its marginalizations and discrimination.”26 State-led violence runs counter to the
mission of UNSCR 1325 and ignores violence that is caused by the state, but in the next section,
scholars explain how the structure of state security itself prevents peace. These particular insights
on the complicity of the state in structural, and sometimes outright sexual, violence are
scrutinized in my analysis of how the regional bodies discuss issues of peacekeeping and sexual
violence, especially under the pillars of Protection and Prevention.
Making War Safe for Women
Cora Weiss, co-author of UNSCR 1325 and director of the Hague Appeal for Peace, said
in 2011 that the purpose of eliminating conflict-related GBV should not be to “make war safe for
women,” but visions of a feminist peace, one that removes the structures of violence instead of
inserting gender equality into them, are arguably difficult to find in the UNSCR 1325
document.27 The concept of “peace and security” is contested among some scholars; Dianne Otto
asserts that the emphasis on “Peace and Security” as opposed to development and human rights
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contradict the feminist understanding of peace and overemphasizes the importance of the
military in building peace and sustainable development.28 Laura Shepherd also disputes the
terminology of WPS and argues that militarism and global inequality impact the nature of a
state’s WPS Agenda. She asserts that UNSCR 1325 is focused on “elite-centric security politics”
composed of leadership from the Global North because “militarism is both pervasive and
produced by/productive of particular ways of thinking about security and peace.”29
Scholars contest the nature of the four pillars of WPS, concerned that addressing issues
such as sexual violence as a problem of war neglects the systemic violence that occurs during
hypothetical times of peace. Aroussi writes that the WPS resolutions focus solely on rape during
conflict and only “prioritise rape by combatants, committed as a tactic of warfare, over other
instances of sexual violence, wherever and however they are committed.”30 The coding of
combatant rape as a weapon of war implies that it is a more serious problem than domestic
violence that occurs post-conflict or sexual assault by peacekeepers has racial connotations. Pratt
contends that measures to correct the violence in peacekeeping, such as efforts toward gender
parity in peacekeeping forces, keep the white, masculine structures of war in place.31 Carol Cohn
rejects both Participation and Protection, asserting that both leave the systems that allow and
encourage war to continue.32 She also highlights that UNSCR 1325 fails to address the gendered
nature of security. The WPS Agenda offers temporary solutions to ongoing problems rather than
facing the structural issues head on, stating:
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“...if sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers is your concern, you can write a
Code of Conduct for peacekeeping troops that has a strict prohibition against
‘fraternization’ with local women...But if it remains off-limits to address the nexus of
militarized power, constructions of masculinities, gendered inequalities in access to paid
work, and global economic inequality, how likely is it that the Code of Conduct will
make a significant difference?”33
The idea of “making war safe for women” directly contradicts with conceptions of feminist
peace, which relies on going beyond traditional conflict to identify the systems that perpetuate
their marginalization. I will draw on the contributions of these scholars to outline how the AU
and EU make war safe for women through the pillar of Participation.
Methodology
After reviewing primary UN, AU and EU documents and reading literature from leading
scholars in the field on National Action Plans (NAPs), I seek to explore the structural differences
among regional approaches to international peace and gender and expose the ongoing
postcolonial relationship between the two regional entities. How does the implementation of
UNSCR 1325 in the AU and EU reflect the objectives of creating a feminist peace? What do the
policies and reports guiding implementation demonstrate about current conceptualizations of
“gender,” “security” and “gender and security?” Through this intervention, I argue that the
language and construction of WPS strategies in the AU and EU reveal that colonialism and
masculine security values still dominate the implementation of these policies, leading to the
othering of women affected by conflict.
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I chose to look at the African Union and the European Union for this analysis due to their
shared colonial history and comparable success in promoting the WPS Agenda. All but two
countries in the African Union have been colonized, largely by European powers. Nora Fisher
Onar and Kalypso Nicolaïdis describe that the EU was constructed through language that
signaled a “virgin birth:” a creation of a new European state removed from the historical legacies
of the countries that compose it.34 Consequently, the development of the EU has acknowledged
little of its member states’ harm through colonialism in Africa, despite atoning for genocides like
the Holocaust.35 I seek to determine if the postcolonial relationship between Europe and Africa
has translated into interventionist policies or a reincarnation of “Mission Civilisatrice,” as
suggested by postcolonial feminist WPS scholars. In addition to the legacy of colonialism, the
AU and the EU both have made considerable progress toward proliferation of National Action
Plans within their memberships. Currently, 25 African Union countries have National Action
Plans (comprising 45.45% of total AU membership), and 22 European Union member states
have NAPs (78.57% of total membership).36 The broad application of the WPS Agenda in these
regional bodies deserves recognition and exploration, as the importance of regional bodies in
implementing UNSCR 1325 has been largely overlooked in the academic sphere.
I will derive my data analysis from four key documents. The African Union has one
document from 2016, entitled “Implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in
Africa,” that provides extensive data about the organization’s approach to WPS, from the local to
international level. I will be deriving my European Union data from three documents: the
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primary and most recent document “Second Report on the EU-indicators for the Comprehensive
Approach to the EU Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 & 1820 on
Women, Peace and Security;” “Indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU
Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 & 1820 on Women, Peace and
Security;” and the EU’s 2008 Regional Action Plan (RAP). The European Union’s Regional
Action Plan was written to coincide with the indicators,37 and both the RAP and first set of
indicators contain vital information that defines essential WPS terms, such as “gender,” “gender
mainstreaming” and each of the four pillars.
In order to conduct this research, I will be doing a structural analysis and a content
analysis of the two documents. For the structural analysis, I seek to assess the institutions
creating the reports, as well as the different structures of the reports themselves. The African
Union implementation document addresses the decision by the AU to not create a Regional
Action Plan, and the European Union made a RAP as well as other reports to measure the
progress of UNSCR 1325. My content analysis will consist of two components: 1) observing the
definitions of gender and the four pillars of women peace and security, and 2) understanding how
each regional body covers the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at each level of governance,
including civil society.
In my second chapter, I will look at the implementation document of the AU and
delineate the existing measures of UNSCR 1325 at varying levels within the AU and clarify how
they relate to notions of feminist peace and postcolonial feminism. Chapter 3 elucidates the WPS
policies of the EU and the postcolonial feminist significance of their relationships with other
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governing bodies. My conclusion further delves into the comparisons between these two regional
organizations, exploring the historical and structural trends that manifest between their varied
implementations of the WPS Agenda. I will draw from the theories examined in my literature
review and theoretical framework to answer 1) how postcolonial feminism operates within each
organization, 2) how postcolonial feminism shapes the dynamic between Europe and Africa in
peacebuilding and 3) to what extent the implementation of the WPS Agenda fulfills expectations
of “feminist peace.”
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CHAPTER II: THE AFRICAN UNION
Involvement in Creation of UNSCR 1325
While the African Union was not yet established in its current iteration at the time of the
passage of UNSCR 1325, African civil society leaders and governments were instrumental in the
creation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS). Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS) was
critical in the creation of UNSCR 1325 but was not technically a founding member of the NGO
Working Group on WPS, which was dominated by six NGOs based in the Global North. Bineta
Diop,38 Senegalese activist and founder and President of FAS, is now the African Union
Commission (AUC) Chairperson’s Special Envoy on Women Peace and Security and oversaw the
creation of the report assessed in this chapter.
Despite the marginalization of Global South voices in the leadership of the WPS NGO
Working Group (and the consequent implementation of UNSCR 1325), African governments took
charge in facilitating UN discussions on WPS. In May 2000, the Namibian Government hosted a
seminar led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations entitled “Mainstreaming a Gender
Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations.” The resulting Windhoek Declaration
and Namibia Plan of Action encouraged gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping processes, defined
by the UN as “The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action,
including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels.”39 Namibia’s leadership
in WPS continued as the country held the UN Security Council presidency in October 2000, the
month of the passage of UNSCR 1325.40 The African Union report celebrates this fact, stating
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“...the Windhoek Declaration of May 2000, championed by Namibia, provided the impetus for the
United Nations Security Council to adopt the first landmark resolution on WPS later that same
year.”41
To evaluate the framework of the African Union related to the WPS Agenda, one must
understand how the African Union operates outside Global North-dominated Security Council
politics and EU operations. In late 1999, the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of
African Unity sought to form the African Union, which was officially created in 2002, to advance
integration and further adopt ideals of Pan-Africanism and a unified continent.42 The Organisation
of African Unity sought to “eradicate all forms of colonialism [specifically European powers] from
the continent.”43 As Europe continues to be involved in Africa through neocolonial peacebuilding
operations, Staeger describes the alternative to Normative Power Europe44 as Pan-Africanism.45
This notion poses the European Union, the exemplar of Normative Power Europe, against the
African Union built on African unity.
Structure/Development of the Report
The African Union Commission Chairperson, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, led the
creation of the 2016 document “Implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in
Africa,” with guidance from the Office of the Special Envoy of the African Union Commission
Chairperson on Women, Peace and Security led by Mme. Bineta Diop. Within the African Union
structure, the Gender, Peace and Security Programme falls under African Peace and Security
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Architecture (APSA) and the Peace and Security Department (PSD). The Office of the Special
Envoy collected the data for the report through conferences of AU Member States and Regional
Economic Communities while also including content about Commission-level initiatives.46 The
authors make specific note that the African Union did not take "the route of organizations such as
the European Union” in creating a Regional Action Plan (RAP), instead opting to create this
document to assess the progress of UNSCR 1325 through other protocols.47 Rather than become
entrenched in the bureaucratic norms of the international WPS Agenda, the African Union
Commission to interpret existing AU architecture, demonstrating a preference for continental and
nationalized measures. At the time of publication of the AU Commission report, 19 African Union
states had National Action Plans (NAPs).
Representation of the Pillars
Main objectives of the document
The African Union document makes clear that the objectives of WPS go beyond conflict
resolution itself. The foreword lists “high levels of economic disenfranchisement, conflict-related
and other forms of sexual and gender based violence, low levels of representation in public
decision- making, poor access to justice and other remedies” as challenges to achieving a “positive
peace,” a term theorized by Johan Galtung to describe both the absence of violence and the healing
from prior violence.48 Like positive peace, feminist peace aims to go beyond traditional notions of
conflict to understand structures of violence that present the threat of further conflict even in times
of peace.
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Although the African Union does not list the four UNSCR 1325 pillars as the main
objectives of its report, it clusters the actions of its member states, three of which include elements
of the four pillars. The five areas of action listed in the “Individual Achievements on 1325
Implementation by Member States and RECs 22 Along the Four Pillars of Participation, Prevention,
Protection, and Relief and Recovery” include:49
1. Legal and policy reform and adoption
2. Women’s participation in various spheres
3. Promotion
4. Implementation institutions
5. Coordination and monitoring
Areas 1-3 all address the four pillars of UNSCR 1325. The description of area one
highlights the gender and policy provisions put into law, particularly those related to sexual and
gender based violence (SGBV), but notes that despite increases in survivor services, there is “less
progress with regards to access to justice and other remedies.” Area two lauds progress toward
gender parity in legislatures, peacekeeping forces and police, but I conclude that this progress is
reflective of the idea of making security-minded, militarized institutions “safer” for women.
This focus makes little effort toward feminist peace because it universalizes women’s
experiences through assumptions of women’s roles in peace processes (as that of a mediator or
bringer of peace) and also infuses systems of power with gender equality instead of unpacking
structural violence. Although sexual violence in peacekeeping forces is a major problem, simply
adding more women to the force does not guarantee that the culture of hypermasculinity that leads
to sexual violence is eliminated and also fails to acknowledge that women are capable of violence
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as well. Area three shows the most progress toward an inclusive peace by familiarizing the public at
all levels through “sensitization, popularization, and training initiatives,” including by translating
documents into local languages. The last two cross-cutting operational areas illustrate the creation
of planning and monitoring mechanisms across civil society organizations, private sector, national
and regional governments.
Assessment of Pillar Progress in AU Country Initiatives
Following this description of the pillars in broader terms, the AU report breaks down
individual achievements among NAPs.50 A multi-page chart contains the main initiatives passed
through NAPs, separated by country and sorted under subcategories of the four UNSCR 1325
pillars represented (not all reports feature all four pillars). Rather than showing the initiatives
grouped directly by UNSCR 1325’s vocabulary or the AU’s assessment, AU member states retain a
level of national autonomy in the reports. The AU report records the pillars as framed by member
states’ NAPs, meaning that initiatives that are grouped within the category of “Protection,” for
example, are labeled as “Protection” not by the AU, but by the nation who created the NAP.
Though the four commonly accepted pillars of Participation, Protection, Prevention and
Relief and Recovery are highlighted among some countries, others use different terminology, such
as “promotion” alongside Protection or “recovery/economic empowerment”51 in lieu of Relief and
Recovery. The examples of the pillars are fluid as well; Liberia labels its initiative to “achieve 20%
women’s representation in security institutions” as Protection and Promotion, while most other
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countries that included gender quotas for representation in security under the pillar of
Participation.52 Guinea’s report combined two pillars, listing a set of initiatives under the branch of
“prevention/protection.” Giving countries autonomy in categorizing their initiatives under the four
pillars may make for a more confusing analysis, but it decentralizes the WPS Agenda.

Figure 1. Representation of UNSCR 1325 Pillars among 19 NAPs53

Participation
As Participation and Protection were the most prominent pillars in the early implementation
of UNSCR 1325, it is no surprise that Participation plays a prominent role in the African Union
report. The measures taken to improve Participation fall largely into three categories: inclusion of
women in politics, security and police forces and peace processes.
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Firstly, the AU report highlights the progress toward gender parity in government. Guinea,
Burkina Faso and Burundi have 30% women quotas for the legislature or political candidates, in
line with the minimum globally recommended figure.54 Rwanda has the most representation of
women in its legislature in the world— at time of the report, 63.8% of members in the Chamber of
Deputies were women.55 While Chapter 3 will explore how the Global North poses itself as a “role
model” to WPS initiatives in the Global South, Rwanda proves that it may be a better role model
for political participation toward other countries within the African Union and beyond. Another
measure to increase women’s participation include the creation of a national database of women for
potential leadership roles in decision-making bodies of the Government in Cote D’Ivoire. The
African Union reports an apparent correlation between low levels of women’s parliamentary
representation and lack of special initiatives to include women, so quotas and women’s leadership
programs appear to be measures by which to successfully integrate more women in politics.56
Although the African Union itself highlights participation in politics in its WPS initiatives,
member nations’ NAPs contain a heavy focus on security. Out of the 15 NAPs that mentioned
Participation, 10 reports included provisions specifically focused on increasing the number of
women in military or police forces. Examples of security-related participation included
“Modification of law on status of National Defense Forces to allow the recruitment of women into
the army” in Burkina Faso,57 “Increase in overall (military & police) women’s participation in
peace support operations from 0.4% to 2% over the last 4 years” in Rwanda,58 and “a specialized
department of gender within the police to enhance the coordination of gender mainstreaming in the
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country’s security institutions” in Guinea Bissau.59 All of these focus on the concept of “making
war safer for women.”
The form of Participation most aligned with driving a feminist peace involves the inclusion
of women in peace processes and post-peacebuilding. Countries like the Central African Republic,
Côte d’Ivoire and Togo enforced gender quotas in truth and reconciliation commissions, and Togo
even appointed a woman to head the Ombudsman’s Office and Office for Reconciliation.60 In
including women in post-peacebuilding processes, perhaps countries will be more inclined to
rework the systems that allowed for war to occur in the first place and build a peace that serves the
needs of the most marginalized.
Protection
Protection, which is frequently paired with promotion, focuses largely on provisions and
justice mechanisms to survivors of sexual and gender based violence, education and sensitization
services, and incorporation of SGBV awareness into policing. Direct resources for those impacted
by sexual violence include free comprehensive services to SGBV survivors in Rwanda. Justice
mechanisms are also prioritized in this section, such as the expansion of the court system and
informational booths to help survivors access legal services in Côte d’Ivoire and deployment of
public defenders in Liberia. Indirect services include sensitivity training, education efforts and
community driven initiatives. Community-led “peace committees'' in Nigeria and civil society
monitoring groups in Guinea ensure progress toward Protection is embedded in local values and
practice. Nigeria’s “Carrying out of an IDP Charter of Demands” and “Commissioning of research
on ‘The Gender Dimension of Social Conflicts Armed Violence and Peace Building’” recognize the
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needs of those disproportionately impacted by conflict and give agency to Global South women.61
This definition of gender not only acknowledges the intersecting struggles that internally displaced
women face, but the framing as “list of demands” acknowledges the basic rights of these groups.
Additionally, emphasis on research could serve to close the gap between “expertise” in the Global
South and the Global North.
Similar to the increase in women’s security sector involvement under the Participation
pillar, efforts to protect women rely on navigating systems that are inherently harmful to women.
Though not exactly aligned with Spivak’s idea of “white men protecting brown women from brown
men,” creation of police corps designed “for the protection of women and girls,” like in the Central
African Republic, paint women as helpless while also designating more power to a militarized
system that hurts women. Gender mainstreaming efforts like The Gambia’s “Incorporation of
gender based violence into the police training curriculum” incorporate some measures to change
systems of violence from within, but gender mainstreaming in policing does not guarantee change
in policing structures themselves.62 Guinea Bissau’s military and police training on women is paired
with a disarmament program and a reduction in the military expenditure, demonstrating steps
toward demilitarization and a feminist peace.
Prevention
Prevention includes legal measures to address gender issues and public affairs initiatives to
promote recognition of UNSCR 1325. The Maputo Protocol, the leading gender document in the
African Union, has only been reported on by three countries. Sierra Leone incorporated the
ratification of this document into their NAP, along with the development of guidelines to integrate
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UNSCR 1325 into local development processes.63 Heavy emphasis was placed on Female Genital
Mutilation/Cutting, with Senegal developing a NAP to specifically eliminate Female Genital
Mutilation/cutting and The Gambia criminalizing Female Genital Mutilation.64
In addition to promoting incorporation of UNSCR 1325 through local and national
governments, Prevention measures also included promoting public awareness of UNSCR 1325.
Togo marked commemoration of “all internationally and regionally recognized days on gender and
violence against women,” and Mali translated all WPS documents into local languages and
developed radio campaigns to address women’s contributions to their peace processes. Though
these measures may appear at first glance to be not directly impacting women’s rights during
conflict, they foster ideals that promote the status of women among the population rather than
simply placing women in places of power.65
Relief and Recovery
Only four countries reported on Relief and Recovery. All four countries emphasized gender
mainstreaming in economic and development policy, like the integration of gender into Guinea
Bissau’s poverty reduction strategy, or specific funding to women’s groups, such as “assistance to
strengthen entrepreneurship” to “women affected by the post-election crisis” in Côte d’Ivoire.66
When considering the policies that can most quickly empower women impacted by conflict,
Relief and Recovery measures are uniquely suited to support feminist peace. The pillar of Relief
and Recovery presents a conception of peace that differs from the others in that it does not achieve
peace through peacekeeping or restructuring of governance, but through addressing the specific
physical and economic needs of women during and after conflict.
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The pillar of Relief and Recovery aligns strongly with feminist peace objectives because it
acknowledges the structural violence that women face economically. When aid post-conflict is
given to the head of household, that most often privileges men. In a gendered analysis of
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes, Vanessa Farr noted that while the
majority of DDR processes have treated families as secondary beneficiaries, this means that an excombatant often controls how DDR benefits are used.67 This does little to protect or provide aid to
the dependents of these ex-combatants.
While the introduction of women into security forces or government bodies may or may not
have a long-term impact, Relief and Recovery measures— such as economic subsidies for women
leaving violent combatant spouses or gender-segregated sanitary facilities for women in refugee
camps— immediately uplift women. The lack of developed plans on Relief and Recovery
demonstrates a misprioritization of the needs of women in the WPS Agenda.
Conclusion
The authors of the AU report note that Protection and Relief and Recovery have made the
least progress, with justice being prevented by “broader structural inequalities.”68 This
acknowledgement of the systemic problems facing women are encouraging but contain little reason
for hope. The current progress, especially in the field of Protection, shows little change in
dismantling the systems that abuse women and other marginalized populations during conflict;
rather, they include women into them with promises of solving conflict. Women’s empowerment
does not occur simply by including women in theses institutions; this generalization of women’s
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capacity to improve peace leans into the universalism of women that feminist peace researchers
advocate against.
Implementation of UNSCR 1325 at Different Levels of Government
This section unpacks the AU’s assessment at different levels of government. The AU report
notes in the introduction that “Africa has domesticated UNSCR 1325, and through the SDGEA
[Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa] provided for reporting on its implementation.”69
At the regional level, the AU has emphasized binding instruments, while subregions focused on
policy frameworks with lesser legal standing. This juxtaposition of legally enforced measures at the
AU level and more political yet less binding policies at lower levels signals that perhaps smaller
forms of governance favor adopting a less internationalized approach to WPS issues.
Local
Measures to implement UNSCR 1325 at the local level include the translation of WPS
documents to reach rural women in Mali and Local Action Plans in some regions within Uganda.70
Sierra Leone and Burundi are creating decentralization guidelines to implement 1325 at local levels,
but most countries emphasize national implementation. However, despite this emphasis on the
local, as Basini and Ryan note, the UNSCR 1325 agenda itself is internationalized. Efforts to build
local peacebuilding upwards and incorporate the ideas of local leaders in national level policies,
instead of the reverse, would better serve to acknowledge the contributions of local women based
on community norms rather than international norms.
National
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The AU report calls for a need to more deeply integrate and streamline NAPs into existing
national institutions, whether directly through NAPs or other mechanisms.71 Although Namibia
proved instrumental in the development of UNSCR 1325, it does not have a traditional NAP.
Instead the Namibian government incorporated a peace and security chapter in its “National Gender
Policy and Action Plan.”72 Other countries have developed similar measures through development
plans, poverty reduction strategies, gender frameworks and security blueprints. The AU report notes
a need to compare how these strategies compare in terms of success with actual NAPs, but the
acknowledgement of country autonomy in developing the report recognizes at least a degree of
decentralization of the UN WPS Agenda, showing that full internationalization of WPS processes is
not necessary to achieve piece.
Subregional
The lowest concentration of NAPs is in Southern, Central and North Africa, while West
Africa has the highest concentration. There are two subregional bodies in the report that the African
Union assessed— the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Thirteen ECOWAS member states have
NAPS out of 15 total, suggesting that subregional involvement may help the process of developing
NAPs.73 While the political will to implement UNSCR 1325 may have been amplified by regional
cooperation, this was not demonstrated among members of IGAD. Out of eight IGAD members
based primarily in the Horn of Africa, Uganda, Kenya, South Sudan have adopted NAPs as of 2016,
and Somalia started the process in 2019. The AU reports that one of its top challenges to
implementation is the limited connection between NAPs and RAPs.
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Continental
While profiling the African Union’s advancements toward the WPS Agenda, the report only
contains highlights for three pillars: Participation, Prevention, Protection and “other.” Although the
AU report placed heavy emphasis on Participation at the national level, women’s representation is
lacking in senior AU leadership positions. Out of 9 special representatives and 11 special envoys,
zero special representatives and only one special envoy was a woman, and the one woman was the
Special Envoy on WPS.74 Compartmentalizing gender issues fails to help integrate women’s issues
and rights into other spheres of governance. However, the “Panel of the Wise,” a consultative body
on peace and security issues, is composed of 60% women.75 The Prevention section of the AU’s
achievements focuses on constructing a Code of Conduct and gender training manual for
peacekeepers, along with a “Continental Early Warning System” and other measures to identify and
prevent sexual violence. Measures of Protection included investigating sexual violence abuses by
the AU Mission in Somalia as well as examining reports of SGBV in South Sudan through a truth
and reconciliation process. These measures serve to observe progress of UNSCR 1325 at lower
levels and to bureaucratize the agenda. Among the listed challenges is “Lasting harmful stereotypes
and attitudes around gender roles.” The acknowledgement of the importance of men’s engagement
in UNSCR 1325 contrasts to the notion of “white men protecting brown women from brown men.”
Mention of the inadequate attention paid to tackling masculinities, “institutional cultures and deeply
embedded patriarchal attitudes'' suggests that changes can occur at the cultural level to change the
institutions imbued with violence.76
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Conclusion
As my analysis demonstrates, the African Union’s 2016 report on the “Implementation of
the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Africa” provides an important lens through which to
understand the progress of feminist peace and the relationship of African Union peacebuilding at
different levels of government. As the African Union explained the progress of the regional
organization itself and its member states in UNSCR 1325, feminist peace remains limited as
systems toward achieving this goal emphasize women’s role in structures that support conflict.
The next chapter dissects how the European Union works opposite to the African Union,
looking outward in its WPS Agenda rather than incorporating UNSCR 1325 within its own member
states. While the AU report includes assessment of NAPs and looks at varying levels of
involvement in the WPS Agenda within its membership, the EU focuses on external “partnerships.”
I will explore the implications of how this arrangement relates to feminist peace through the
universalization of women and preservation of systems of violence.
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CHAPTER III: EUROPEAN UNION
Involvement in Creation of UNSCR 1325
Peacebuilding interventions among European Union member states, including the
implementation of UNSCR 1325, show a clear connection to histories of colonialism. Postcolonial
scholars like Roland Paris argue that European involvement in African peacebuilding is a
reincarnation of the civilizing mission.77 While the predecessor to the African Union was built with the
purpose to “remove all forms of colonialism” from the continent, the EU was founded on three
principles in the Schuman Declaration in 1950: pool French coal and German steel production to
ensure peaceful relations, raise European living standards after WWII and develop the African
continent within the framework of continued European imperialist expansion.78 Tarak Barkawi and
Mark Laffey explain that European peacebuilding efforts frame violence as a result of lack of
governance in the form of the modern European nation-state, a conceptualization that values likeness
to Europe as essential to “good governance.”79
While conflict on the African continent often has direct ties to colonial and post-colonial
legacies, language within the EU toward these conflicts ignores European involvement. In 2015,
former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini
encouraged the European Union to “go beyond the donor–recipient relationship of the past and reflect
a political partnership of equals.”80 According to Ueli Staeger, this language of partnership frames
members of the African Union as, at best, simply receivers of normative goods from the Global North
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while erasing exploitative practices under European colonialism. This language also assumes that
European norms are universal. Staefer notes that speeches from the European commission emphasize
“partnership and shared norms,” including human rights and good governance, both of which have
malleable definitions.81 Himadeep Muppidi theorizes that “postcolonial globality,” the acceptance of
values that are formed by diverse identities rather than assumed to be universal, is required for
inclusive globality as opposed to colonial globality that is formed by the “silencing of difference.82
While respect for human life certainly is a shared value across all cultures, postcolonial scholars note
that the lens through which this respect is viewed must not center European norms as universal
expectations.
During the early conceptions of the WPS Agenda at the time of the Beijing Conference, the
European Union was just establishing itself as a political entity. With the passage of the Maastricht
Treaty in 1993, the EU transitioned from the European Economic Community into its current
intergovernmental iteration and further integrated Eastern European states following the Cold War. Six
NGOs from the Global North composed the NGO Working Group on WPS, which was formed at the
March 2000 UN Commission on the Status of Women meeting: Women’s International League for
Peace and Freedom (WILPF) (Geneva); Amnesty International (London); International Alert
(London); Hague Appeal for Peace (Hague); Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children
(NY/DC/Geneva); and Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice (New York, the Hague), four of which are
based in the EU. While the European Union as a governmental entity may not have had a heavy hand
in the creation of the WPS Agenda, these groups certainly represented its values and norms.
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Structure/Development of the Report
The European Union’s strategy for WPS was developed under the European External Action
Service, the primary international facing body of the EU. As mentioned in my methodology, the
European Union wrote the 2008 Regional Action Plan (RAP) as a general overview to be assessed
later through a series of indicators; in this research, I draw my primary analysis from the second set,
which was released closer to the publication of the AU report. Both the RAP and first set of indicators
from 2010 contain vital information that defines essential WPS terms, such as “gender,” “gender
mainstreaming” and each of the four pillars. I will assess the language of the second set of indicators
but will include the earlier definitions of the pillars and gender as they apply to the documents as a set.
The information in the indicators is derived from three different questionnaires— based on
organization type— sent to EU delegations, EU Member States, the 11 EU Special Representatives
and Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations. The time period covered is
October 2010 to December 2012. There was a lower response rate to the second indicators compared
to the first set of indicators; the report authors attribute a lower response rate compared to the first
report (59% compared to 89%) due to the first report’s ability to capitalize on the 10th anniversary of
UNSCR 1325. Among the 28 member states at the time of the report, 16 EU member states had
National Action Plans (NAPs).83
Gender Definitions
According to the EU report, gender is defined as “the socially constructed differences, as
opposed to the biological ones, between women and men; this means differences that have been
learned, are changeable over time, have wide variations both within and between cultures.”84
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This aligns with Hooper’s definition, focusing on the socially conceptualized differences
between men and women, while also addressing Hooper’s theory of multiple masculinities.
The Council of Europe’s definition of gender mainstreaming involves “the
(re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender
equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages by the actors
normally involved in policy-making.”85 This goes beyond simply promoting gender equality
through legislation; rather, it seeks to approach all angles of policy from a gendered perspective.
The EU report further elaborates that gender mainstreaming should occur in tandem with specific
policies targeted to increase gender equality.
The EU’s gender-based violence (GBV) definition is vague and explicitly labeled as an
“umbrella term,” but in doing so encompasses a broader scope of GBV than only sexual
violence.86 Its definition as “any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s will, and that is
based on socially ascribed (gender) differences between males and females,” recognizes that
GBV can happen to people of all genders, but the report also notes that GBV is especially
prevalent among women. The RAP elaborates that “it is important to note, however, that men
and boys may also be victims of gender-based violence, especially sexual violence.”
Representation of the Pillars
The first report on the EU indicators for UNSCR 1325 includes definitions for the four
pillars.87 While the 17 indicators are not sorted by pillar in the second report itself, I have
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identified and grouped the indicators into five sections based on these definitions. In the second
report of EU indicators, which I will base my analysis on, indicators 1, 4 and 6 do not clearly
address any one pillar, and instead focus more on increasing involvement in the WPS Agenda
among other countries, both in and outside of the EU. Prevention relies on the concepts of gender
mainstreaming presented in the 2008 RAP, including the goal to “mainstream a gender equality
perspective into all conflict prevention activities and strategies.”88 This pillar manifests in
Indicators 12, 13, 14 and 16, which focus on training for EU peacekeeping staff. The other two
components of this definition, “develop effective gender-sensitive early warning mechanisms
and institutions” and “strengthen efforts to prevent violence against women, including various
forms of gender-base [sic] violence, and fight against impunity on gender based and sexual
violence,” occurs through the indicators 3 and 10 that are focused on hosting dialogues.
Participation is defined by three concepts: “promote and support women’s active and
meaningful participation in all peace processes as well as their representation in formal and
informal decision-making at all levels; improve partnership and networking with local and
international women’s rights groups and organisations; [and] recruit and appoint women to
senior positions.”89 Indicators 8 and 9 outline EU involvement with women in peace processes in
non-EU countries, while Indicator 11 looks directly at women’s participation in EU institutions.
The European Union’s definition of the pillar Protection goes beyond physical protection,
seeking to “strengthen and amplify efforts to secure the safety, physical or mental health, wellbeing, economic security and/or dignity of women and girls; promote and safeguard human
rights of women and mainstream a gender perspective into the legal and institutional reforms.”
This inclusive definition does not just focus on sexual violence, moving beyond the original
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conceptions of Protection in UNSCR 1325. However, the language used for “safeguarding” and
the policies of Protection are applied mostly to the Global South, leaning into the idea of
“women’s rights” as universally created yet requiring intervention from the Global North.
Indicator 15 is the only indicator with a heavy focus on Protection, addressing the issue of sexual
assault by EU peacekeepers.
The pillar of Relief and Recovery is defined as the promotion of “women’s equal access to aid
distribution mechanisms and services including those dealing with the specific needs of women and
girls in all relief recovery efforts.” Indicators 2, 5 and 7 focus on the funding aspect of Relief and
Recovery, while Indicator 17 looks at sex-disaggregated data to understand the gendered aspect of
asylum seekers in EU member states.
One of the most notable differences between the AU and EU reports is that the European
Union report has its own definitions of the four pillars of UNSCR 1325, compared to the definitions
and groupings of initiatives in the African Union by AU member states. In the next part of this
chapter, I present how the European Union applies the pillars, as conceptualized through these
definitions, within its borders and (primarily) beyond.
Indicators Across Different Institutions
The analysis in this section compares the implementation of the EU’s WPS strategy across four
geographical groups: EU member states, Non-EU countries, regional groups and EU delegations.
Rather than nationalizing WPS, the European Union has internationalized its implementation.
According to the report, “Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East are the regions where the EU
support is most evident.”90 The EU uses several terms to code the Global South, including “Third
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countries,” “fragile, conflict or post-conflict countries,” and “partner countries.” Third countries,
defined by the EU as “a country that is not a member of the European Union as well as a country or
territory whose citizens do not enjoy the European Union right to free movement,”91 sounds similar to
the term third world countries and evokes the same idea of periphery. Although these countries are
physically outside of the governance of the EU, the terminology distances them as countries on which
to impose EU norms. The idea of “partner countries” reiterates the notion that the norms presented in
UNSCR 1325, and more broadly, asserts that the current rhetoric around human rights are derived
from universal values rather than thinkers and decision makers in power in the Global North. The EU
second set of indicators primarily focuses its success in states with EU delegations or states on the
EU’s involvement in states on the OECD’s list of States of Fragility, most of which are within the
African Union. “Fragile, conflict, or post-conflict countries,” labels which are determined by a Global
North multilateral organization that seeks to promote market economies and liberal democracy abroad,
evoke the idea that these countries are in need of intervention from “strong” states.
Additionally, the EU consistently uses the term “support” to describe the institution and
member states’ involvement in UNSCR 1325 abroad. The language used through the EU document to
“support” efforts gives the impression on the one hand that the EU members are hands off in their
approach, letting other national authorities take the lead abroad. However, the emphasis on this
support, as well as the several indicators that insist on getting involved in conflicts as far and wide as
possible, undercut this possible meaning. The terminology used to describe countries outside of the
EU may serve to marginalize them, but the EU’s Second Set of Indicators for UNSCR 1325 center
around these states.
EU Member States
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Across all 17 indicators, only two directly addressed EU member states and their
policymaking, Indicators 6 and 17. Although Indicator 6 explicitly seeks the number of NAPs (or
alternatives) in EU Member States, the evaluation of this indicator includes information on the
adoption of NAPs and RAPs worldwide. The case study of Ireland’s NAP is discussed, but it focuses
on Irish Aid and international development rather than Ireland’s recent conflict, in which the EU had
been heavily involved through the PEACE III project.92 Although the PEACE III project involved
community-based discussions and framed itself based on UNSCR 1325, there was no mention of this
program in the Ireland Action Plan from 2011-2014, nor the EU second set of indicators. The other
indicator that assessed EU member state policies was Indicator 17, which measures the proportion and
country of origin of asylum-seeking men and women who have received refugee status or other
member state protection. The assessment lists the number of female asylum applicants compared to
men, as well as the proportion of the women who received protection and refugee status but does not
list the percentage of men who receive protection and refugee status.93 This is an oversight in gender
mainstreaming, for if they do not list all the sex disaggregated data, then there is little to compare to to
assess in what ways refugee policy may or may not be failing women. The EU definitions of the pillars
clarify objectives that in theory serve women and the objectives of peace; however, the inability to
meaningfully implement these goals within EU member states demonstrates a need to more
comprehensively evaluate its progress.
Non-EU Countries
Indicators 1 and 8 cover the actions of WPS within “partner countries,” or non-EU countries.
The first indicator on the success of the WPS Agenda in the EU is driven by the breadth of its
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implementation outside the EU, demonstrating an ongoing postcolonial mindset. Progress for Indicator
1 is based on the quantity of countries where the EU is involved in WPS activities without accounting
for the perceived or actual impact on these communities. The report states that “The EU and Member
States target their support broadly across many regions in e.g. Africa, Asia and Latin America,
demonstrating that this is an issue on which consciousness increases across different regions of the
world.” The framing of this sentence implies that the EU is the one building consciousness of WPS
globally. Many of the first 10 countries to enact NAPs are in fact EU Member States, but formulation
of the WPS Agenda already involved significant contributions from stakeholders in the regions
referenced. The idea of spreading the WPS Agenda mirrors a colonial mindset that aims to spread
liberal democratic values around the world without sharing whether or not these actions are improving
the conditions of women in these countries.94
For Indicator 8, EU member states report supporting women in peace negotiations in 10
countries: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Madagascar,
Maldives, South Sudan and Sudan. A 2012 study for the EU Mediation Support Team found that “it
was difficult to find a region in which the EU had not in some form been involved in mediation efforts
(either in lead or providing political, financial or technical support),” which the report authors use as
justification to include broad facts from UN Women about women’s representation in peace
processes.95 Support primarily included financial aid and training in mediation and negotiation for
women, while some EU delegations reported undefined support that was not backed up by data.96
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Regional Groups
In addition to looking at individual countries outside of the EU, the EU second set of indicators
mentions other regional organizations, including the African Union, in Indicators 2, 3 and 7. Indicators
2 and 7 outline the financial instruments and joint partnerships for women, peace and security in
partner countries and regional and international organizations. The main methods of funding were the
Instrument for Stability and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, with funds
donated to civil society groups and projects led by the EU and UN Women. 40% of IfS funding is
contributed to UN operations, including UNDP, UN Women and the UN Department of Political
Affairs. Many of these efforts focus on Participation and training for women mediators and
negotiators.97 Indicator 7 states that “There is strong cooperation between the EU and many other
organisations, including the United Nations, NATO, African Union and ASEAN,” but the challenge is
“There is less reported engagement with international financial institutions, indicating that there is
more work to be done in this field.”98 One of the main obstacles toward progress in the WPS Agenda
is the lack of financial resources, but by acting as a mediator between financial institutions and
countries who need WPS funding, the EU filters project funding through its own norms.
Indicator 3 looks at the number of WPS dialogues among EU delegations within other regional
bodies— The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, League of Arab States, Pacific Islands Forum,
African Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe— as well as looking at
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU’s Enlargement Policy. Horký-Hlucháň and
Kratochvíl argue that the ENP constructs the Balkans and Eastern Europe as an ambiguous and
transitional other while masking the asymmetric and dominant structure of the ENP through a liberal-
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democratic discourse.99 The assessment of progress for this indicator on ENP states that “In some
countries, the new laws intended to ensure a better gender balance in parliament have however
encountered resistance and therefore failed to achieve the desired effect.”100 In my analysis, this
framing blames the failures of gender balance on cultural issues, uplifting the EU as a utopia of liberal
democracy while stating that it is in non-EU European countries’ nature to resist women’s rights. This
indicator also assesses its primary challenge as being “able to track, during the next reporting period,
what practical effect these dialogues have had.” The visibility of dialogues gives the appearance of
significant EU impact in non-EU countries, but the lack of data to prove such advancements leaves
little success to measure.
EU Delegations
Ten indicators focus on projects in non-EU countries led by EU delegations. Indicator 4 looks
slightly more in depth in the relationship with member states and non-EU countries, addressing the
quantity and type of coordination between these bodies and donors. However, the EU had reduced
progress in this indicator, with fewer delegations reporting reference to local coordination
mechanisms, despite an increase in specific UNSCR 1325 coordination groups.101 While the
assessment shows that EU delegations are still involved with local stakeholders and seeks to increase
that involvement, the trend is toward implementing EU and UNSCR 1325-driven measures rather than
focusing on local efforts. Indicator 5 assessed the “number of projects or programmes in specific
sectors...implemented in fragile, conflict or post conflict countries” as reported by 25 EU delegations
(eight of which were based in states categorized as fragile, conflict or post conflict).102 Most projects
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were in the realm of human rights and civil society, and Afghanistan received the most financial
support from EU member states.
Indicators 9 and 10 address involvement and discussions among EU delegations, EU Member
States' embassies and CSDP missions related to women’s participation in non-EU member state peace
processes.103 Indicator 9 acknowledges the need to understand women’s diverse roles in conflict and
peace, noting that “...activities branded as promoting UNSCR 1325 may wrongly perpetuate the
portrayal of women as victims and not as agents and actors which is still a major stumbling block in
involving women in formal peace processes.” Indicator 10 is largely bureaucratic, reporting the
number of meetings between EU delegations, EU Member States' embassies and CSDP missions with
women's groups and NGOs on UNSCR 1325. Counting the number of meetings tokenizes
implementation of the WPS Agenda in the Global South. Roland Paris writes that one of the
manifestations of a modern “Mission Civilisatrice” in promoting liberal democratic norms manifests in
westerners providing “expertise” to local communities in creation of government, which is represented
Indicator 10’s goal to meet with as many WPS CSOs as possible.104
While Indicator 11— “Proportion of women and men among heads of diplomatic missions,
staff participating in UN peacekeeping operations and CSDP mission at all levels, including military
and police staff” — looks at the participation of women within EU institutions, Indicators 12, 13, 14
and 16 address gender mainstreaming in EU missions.105 Although Indicator 11 is among the few
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instances of the EU looking inward at its application of the UNSCR 1325 pillars in its own
institutions, it still portrays the EU as an expert on WPS compared to other states. The assessment for
Indicator 11 includes a quote from the report “Equal Power, Lasting Peace,” created by Kvinna till
Kvinna, a Swedish women’s organization funded by the EU Instrument for Stability. The report states,
“The different actors within the international community, such as the EU and the UN, should lead by
example and be role models for women’s participation and women’s human rights. They likewise have
a key role to play in bringing the voices of women from conflict-affected regions into policy making,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation.”106 The labeling of the EU as a role model perpetuates
Spivak’s theories and can be considered especially patronizing considering the EU’s lack of progress
in some of the pillars that AU member states are doing well in (i.e., the Rwandan legislature has the
highest proportion of women in Parliament in the world at 61%, compared to 47% in Sweden, which is
the EU member state with the highest proportion of women).107 Indicator 16 assesses the proportion of
EU Special Representative (EUSR) reports that include information on WPS. The nine reports detail
varying levels of action to more meaningfully integrate UNSCR 1325, but what is most noteworthy is
not the content but who wrote it. Out of nine EUSRs who responded to the survey, only one, the
EUSR to Sudan and South Sudan Dame Rosalind Mardsen, is a woman.108 The EU leans on its
perceived duty as a role model in its outward-facing UNSCR 1325 directives, but this framing shrouds
its need for continued work on WPS within its own institutions.
Indicator 15 looks at the number of investigations of sexual abuse or exploitation by Common
Security and Defence Policy. This indicator’s assessment was the shortest out of the report, despite
being one of the indicators that most directly aligns with the pillars of UNSCR 1325. The indicator
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describes no further action on addressing sexual abuse by CDSP staff, instead offering only a
paragraph on the number of investigations and mention of a half day EU-UN Women training on
SGBV in 2012. It also paints sexual assault by peacekeepers as one-off problems that can be addressed
through disciplinary action. As Carol Harrington writes, “Resolution 1325 has allowed
acknowledgement of peacekeeping operations’ sexist culture at the highest level by representing this
culture as a technically manageable problem.”109 The EU has clearly invested in WPS abroad, but
within its own security bodies, the values of feminist peace are yet to be achieved.
Conclusion
Unlike the African Union report, the European Union’s WPS strategy focuses primarily on the
implementation of peace and security measures by EU bodies outside the EU. The varied and immense
financial resources provided by the EU prove to be valuable in underfinanced local peacebuilding
projects. However, the characterization of the EU as a “role model,” as defined in the Kvinna till
Kvinna quote, presents reasons for pause. While countries within the EU borders have faced recent
conflict, the European Union frames itself as a harbinger of peace to other nations. It may be
commonly understood that all role models have flaws, but the EU report signals little need for internal
improvement. It is notable that among the extensive indicators focusing on regional dialogue and
promotion of women’s participation, the shortest analysis goes toward Indicator 15. This indicator,
which discusses EU peacekeeper SGBV briefly with a series of numbers and little forward action,
represents how the EU and other entities do not view security as a field needing reform. This analysis,
as well as the rest of the EU WPS strategy, leaves the question, how can peace be found in a system
built for violence?
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CHAPTER IV: COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION
As demonstrated in my analysis of the African Union and the European Union, the
existing strategies to promote UNSCR 1325 fail to guide policies toward feminist peace and rely
on colonial security structures that fail to uplift women outside the confines of existing power
systems. To further demonstrate the postcolonial relationship between the African Union and
European Union, I directly compare the regional implementations to explain how
postcolonialism and feminism critique these two institutions’ WPS strategies in different ways.
Differences between AU and EU Implementation
Historical Meaning behind the Implementation of the WPS Agenda
The current form of regional bodies like the African Union and the European Union are
relatively modern and intertwined with colonialism. The EU was built as an economic alliance in
response to World War II’s destabilization of the European economy, and as mentioned in
Chapter 3, part of the reasoning for this alliance was the “development of the African continent.”
The founding EU document, the Schuman Declaration, explicitly sought to remain entangled in
African political and economic affairs. The African Union was built upon principles of panAfricanism, seeking to define a unified front against the exploitation of European colonialism
and apartheid.
Impacted by the clear ties to colonialism in both bodies’ foundations, the most prominent
problem in implementing UNSCR 1325 may have colonial roots. The AU report notes that its
most common challenge is “the issue of sustainable and adequate funding for implementation
and monitoring,”110 which is a stark contrast with the EU report’s major initiatives to fund
projects in Global South countries.
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Drawing from colonial history and Walter Rodney’s application of Dependency Theory
to Africa, this peacebuilding challenge, as well as conflict itself, can in some ways be traced
back to European exploitation of African resources.111 Through the draining of African resources
over centuries of imperialism, European nations created a climate ripe for conflict. The
positioning of Europe as a role model and philanthropist for African states ignores their
involvement on the continent that led to needs for peacebuilding.
The African Peace and Security Apparatus was central to the creation of the AU in 2001,
but Niall Duggan and Toni Haastrup argue that this instrument of peace and security has been
disrupted by Chinese and European interventions.112 The EU is among the largest financial
contributors to the G5 Sahel in Africa, a subregional organization. Duggan and Haastrup assert
that this European funding disrupts existing mandates with the AU, “undermines African agency
and highlights African anxieties about the entrenchment of French coloniality on the continent.”
Additionally, by providing finances to African partners in peacebuilding, the European
Union asserts control over the values prioritized in these processes. The African Peace Facility,
established in 2004 and financed through the European Development Fund, received 2.7 billion
between 2004 and 2017, with around 91% of funding funneled toward peace support
operations.113 From my analysis, this direction to funding primarily related to peacekeeping
operations suggests that the EU invests heavily in the continued militarization of peace
processes. This does not mean that the AU would not funnel a similar proportion of finances into
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peacekeeping operations without the EU funding; however, it does affirm that EU collaborations
on peace and security contribute financially to security structures rather than Relief and
Recovery efforts.
Categorization of Pillars
As mentioned in the “Representation of the Pillars” section in Chapter 3, the
categorization of the WPS pillars in the African Union are derived by member states’ own plans
when referring to National Action Plans, whereas the European Union constructed its own
definitions for Protection, Participation, Prevention and Relief and Recovery. Although the
European Union approach initially seems more standardized and easier to implement, the value
of standardization is overshadowed by the norm-recipient relationship evident in this way. In a
way, the African Union report is still more localized in its implementation and creation than the
European Union report, but is this enough to achieve a postcolonial feminist peace? Postcolonial
scholars like Helen Basini and Caitlyn Ryan assert that National Action Plans are inherently an
ineffective way to uplift women in conflict, for they are built on European norms and must be
incorporated into the local structures, both through political will and actual infrastructure.114
Basini and Ryan found that local organizations already promoted elements of UNSCR 1325
without knowing about the UN WPS Agenda. Those community organizations that did
participate in the creation of NAPs felt proud of local contributions to NAPs, but this structure
directed local efforts rather than supporting existing ones. To combat the postcolonial tendencies
of the Global North when intervening in the Global South, the recognition and support of salient
local measures outside of the technocracy of UNSCR 1325 and action plans is essential.
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Problem of Protection
While sexual violence in conflict— covered mainly by the pillar of Protection in UNSCR
1325— is a majorly publicized problem, the African Union and European Union both stated in
their reports that the protection of women against sexual and gender-based violence was most
lacking in progress. The European Union RAP states that “With regard to the protection of
women, the weakest pillar of the implementation of Resolution 1325 is prevention and response
to Sexual and Gender-based Violence.”115 Is the scope of the problem believed to be so large that
it seems to be falling behind, or are the mechanisms to prevent sexual violence not effective?
From my analysis, I conclude both. While the problem of SGBV is frequently mentioned in the
WPS implementations (re: White People saving Brown Women from Brown Men), the systems
that foment some of this violence— namely security and peacekeeping forces— remain intact.
This is but one of the ways that the regional implementations fail to respond to the underlying
militarization that reinforces conflict and violence against women.
Patronizing Participation
Both the African Union and the European Union prioritized measures to increase
Participation. Within the African Union, this manifested as increased women’s representation in
places of power— from AU administrative roles to security forces— while the EU focused
largely on hosting dialogues among regional bodies and training women in negotiation and
mediation. The pillar of Participation boils down to who holds power. In the AU, power is
distributed to women through existing national and regional security and governmental
structures. The EU’s Participation initiatives focus on distributing power through international
dialogues and trainings that center EU norms as a means to achieve peace.
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The lack of conversation on direct “partnerships” with the AU and large presence of such
partnerships with EU countries demonstrates how the EU prioritizes imposition of its norms over
collaboration. Despite the frequent mention of EU countries and emphasis on regional
partnership, there was actually little mention of co-existing EU partnership with the African
Union. Though the EU report highlighted nations with which the organization was involved,
most of this emphasis was on the Global South. In fact, the EU member states reported working
with 77 countries to implement UNSCR 1325, with 43 of these countries serving as members of
the AU.116 EU Indicator 3, which talks about the number of regional dialogues, only has two
sentences on anticipated meetings between the two regional bodies, whereas other regional
partnerships had up to two pages covered. Though I do not seek to proclaim that more AU-EU
partnership is a good or bad thing, this shows that “partner” relationships mentioned in Chapter 3
are more rhetorical than practical. This pattern may also serve as evidence of the European
Union’s perceived status of WPS “role model.”
Conclusion
The current handling of WPS Agenda does not achieve feminist peace, in part because
many of its practices are colonial in nature. Scholars such as Dianne Otto suggest changing the
rhetoric of WPS to include development instead of security, shifting the understanding of the
field to one that does not include war. The African Union report even incorporated some of this
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language, stating “As a continental body, we recognize the critical and dynamic nexus between
gender, development, and peace and security.”
While many postcolonial feminist scholars have focused on the institutions of the UN in
analyzing the WPS Agenda, this thesis offers an assessment of how the issues presented by these
postcolonial feminists emanate at the regional level. By researching at the regional level, we can
observe the postcolonial relationships that linger between Europe and Africa. The EU’s language
of “shared values and partnerships,” as expressed by Mogherini in Chapter 3, frame Africa as
dependent on European aid and values, erasing a colonial legacy that stifled development and
kindled violence on the continent. Europe frames itself as a “role model” for WPS while ignoring
European genocide and militarization, both within European borders and on the African
continent.
While I found documents that provided useful context for the AU and EU, they were not
perfect comparisons. The EU had significantly more WPS-specific content and reports that I
would like to have analyzed but analyzing these materials in-depth would be outside of my time
limitations and would have distracted from my focus on comparing the approaches of the AU
and EU equally. If I had unlimited time and comprehension of national histories, I would look at
each individual country’s National Action Plan to understand how they incorporate the actions of
local NGOs and actors. Another trend I noticed, as briefly mentioned in the European Union
chapter, is that of Global North countries (such as Denmark) providing critiques and guidelines
for countries in the Global South. I would be interested to continue to scrutinize postcolonial
relationships with WPS at the national level through these documents, especially among
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countries like Britain. The U.K. National Action Plan has nine “focus countries” in which it
assesses WPS efforts, six of which are former British protectorates and colonies.117
Over the past 20 years, UNSCR 1325 has made women’s salience and agency in conflict
and peace visible. While women’s involvement in peacebuilding certainly provides value to
those seeking peace, the structures through which these women often work against providing
value to these women. These structures of power, within the UN and regional bodies like the
European Union and the African Union, derive from exclusionary legacies that suit men from the
Global North. A feminist peace cannot be found among feminist peacekeepers; instead, it must
be found among those who traditional conceptions of security fail to protect.

117

Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security 2018- 2022, London:
HM Government, January 2018,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/677586/FCO1215
-NAP-Women-Peace-Security-ONLINE_V2.pdf; Afghanistan, Burma, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria.
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APPENDIX
To further contextualize Hooper’s concept of gender binaries in international relations as defined
in the introduction, I created the following chart and applied her dichotomies of masculine and
feminine and applied them to the language of UNSCR 1325. I aimed to give a brief illustration of
how the masculine qualities are valued within the language of the resolution.
Masculine

Feminine

Masculine Manifestations in UNSCR 1325

Rationality, logic

Intuition, Empathy

The resolution promotes women’s
meaningful involvement in peace processes
based on “the important role of women in the
prevention and resolution of conflicts and in
peace-building” rather than simply their
humanity (UNSCR 1325, line 5).

Strength, power

Vulnerability

UNSCR 1325 “Expand[s] the role and
contribution of women in United Nations
field-based operations, and especially among
military observers, civilian police...”
(UNSCR 1325, section 4). This gives women
expanded power and strength so long as they
operate within the confines of security roles.

Autonomy, boundary
setting, control,
Competitiveness

Cooperation

UNSCR 1325 “Urges Member States to
increase their voluntary financial, technical
and logistical support for gender-sensitive
training efforts, including those undertaken
by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia,
the United Nations Fund for Women and
United Nations Children’s Fund, and by the
Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and other
relevant bodies;” (UNSCR 1325, section 7).
This funding of UN-level bodies prioritizes
the autonomy and control of the UN in
implementing the agenda rather than local
actors.
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